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UTILIZATION OF RULES OF EVIDENCE IN
FEDERAL COURTS TO SUPERVISE CONDUCT OF
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
EDWARD

P.

LYONS, JR.*

It was an axiom of the common law of evidence that, "the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means through
which the party has been enabled to obtain the evidence."1 The legal
rationale for this principle was that an objection to the introduction
of evidence raised only questions of competency, relevancy or materiality, and that courts should not be diverted from the main issues of
the case by the necessity of determining the legality of the means by
which evidence had been obtained. In its application to criminal
trials, the rule was buttressed by strong considerations of public policy,
for it was thought that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
would unreasonably hinder the punishment of criminals. This view
was reconciled with the principle that law enforcement officers are to
be held accountable for their illegal acts, by the theory that their
punishment would come through a separate criminal or civil action
at the instance of the individual injured, while the current of criminal justice flowed on unimpeded. The universal respect in which this
common law precept was held is evidenced by the fact that, until comparatively recent years, it stood unblemished by qualifications or exceptions, a phenomenon all too rare among legal principles. 2
In view of the public policy served by the application of this principle to criminal prosecutions, it was thought that it was most impregnable in the criminal field. However, since the beginning of the
present century, the Supreme Court of the United States, motivated by
countervailing considerations of policy, has seen fit to encroach upon
*Member of the Memphis, Tennessee, Bar; formerly editor of the WASHINGTON
AND LEE LAw REvmW.
18 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 194o) 5.

-For a discussion of the common lav rule, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.
194o) § 2183.
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the common law rule by appending major exceptions thereto. These
rules, applying only to criminal trials, render inadmissible in any federal court evidence which was obtained by federal officers by means of
certain interdicted practices. As yet, departures from the orthodox
principle have been limited in scope. However, recent opinions suggest
that these already established exceptions may be indicative of a new
judicial doctrine, which could substantially obliterate the common law
rule in federal criminal trials. Since the nature and progress of this doctrine has been determined by the uncertain criterion of public policy,
an inquiry into its origin and development is prerequisite to an appreciation of its present status and future implications.
The seeds of legal heresy were sown in 1886, by the much maligned
Supreme Court case of Boyd v. United States.3 The classic significance
of this case lay, not in its holding, but in the novel theory advanced in
its support.4 In the Boyd opinion, the Court evolved an unique dialectic
which required conjunctive application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 5 Since the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compulsory
self-incrimination had long been interpreted to exclude evidence having such a tendency, this theory provided legal justification for exclusion of evidence obtained by violations of the Fourth Amendment,
which contains no. such exclusionary mandate.
s6 U. S. 6M6, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. ed. 746 (1886).
'In the Boyd case, defendant questioned the validity of a federal statute which
authorized a federal judge to order the production of a party's private papers and
records in court. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional insofar as it
applied to criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, and declared that the trial court
had committed reversible error by admitting evidence through compliance therewith.
It is now generally recognized that this result was proper in view of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940) § 2264.

TFirst, the Court established, by means of historical references, that the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment was so
related, to the guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, as to make the two clauses mutually explanatory.
It then decided that a court order compelling the production of private papers
was in effect a search and seizure, and that, insofar as such a procedure was utilized
in criminal trials, it was for a purpose prohibited by the Fifth Amendment-i.e.,
self-incrimination.
From this the Court reasoned that, in view of the historical affinity of the two
Amendments, a search and seizure for a purpose violative of the Fifth Amendment
amounted to an "unreasonable" search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Hence, that the statute providing for such a procedure was unconstitutional under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and that evidence so obtained must be excluded under the Fifth Amendment.

1950].

RULES OF EVIDENCE

In 1914, despite its repudiation by the intervening Adams case, 6
the Boyd opinion was seized upon by the Supreme Court as a precedent,
and its implications converted into law. In Weeks v. United States,7
property belonging to defendant had been seized during his absence by
federal officers acting without a warrant. Before trial, defendant made a
motion for the return of all this property, relying on the protection of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. As to property to be introduced
in evidence at the trial, this motion was denied, and he appealed to
the Supreme Court on this ground. The Court limited the Adams decision to its facts, ruled that the warrantless search and seizure here
involved was "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and, citing the Boyd case, held that defendant's motion
should have been granted. Thus, under the Weeks holding, property
obtained by means of a warrantless search and seizure is not only inadmissible in evidence against the defendant, but must be returned to
him, provided he makes a pre-trial motion to this effect.
The philosophy underlying the Weeks decision is more significant
then the reasoning induced by that philosophy. The Court felt that vital constitutional guarantees had been violated by federal law enforcement officers, and that it was the duty of the Court to implement these
guarantees by refusing to be a party to their violation. The "misguided
sentimentality" of which the Court has been accused,8 is apparent in its
opinion: "If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4 th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to pun'Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372, 48 L. ed. 575 (19o4). Defendant alleged that during a search and seizure under warrant, certain papers not
covered by the warrant had been seized. He contended that, under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was entitled to protection against state
action comparable to his protection against federal action under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. Hence, that, in view of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in the Boyd case, these papers were improperly
admitted in evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court expressed reluctance to detract
from the authority of the Boyd opinion, but ignored its holding by refusing to
consider the constitutional question. Rather, it based its affirmance squarely on the
common law rule that, "In such cases the weight of authority as well as reason
limits the inquiry to the competency of the proffered testimony, and the courts
do not stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence was obtained." 192 U. S.
585, 588, 24 S. Ct. 372, 374, 48 L. ed. 575, 579 (1904).
7232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
8
See 8 Wigmore, Evidence ( 3 d ed. 1940) § 2184.
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ishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice
of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of
the land." 9 In short, the Supreme Court weighed the individual rights
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment against the social benefits to be
derived from unhindered criminal prosecutions, and concluded that
the former were worthy of the greater solicitude.
Such was the origin of the Supreme Court's first encroachment on
the common law rule that the means used in obtaining evidence do not
affect its admissibility. By its Weeks decision the Court established a
significant exception to this rule, and espoused the hitherto heretical
principle of enforcing constitutional directives by means of a judicially
established rule of evidence.
The limitations of the Weeks rule should be emphasized. It purports to be no more than a rule of evidence which renders inadmissible
any evidence obtained by means of a warrantless search and seizure.
Since its purpose was to implement the Fourth Amendment, its application is limited to federal courts,' 0 and to evidence obtained by federal
officers." Of the several protections in the Fourth Amendment, the rule
effectuates only the search and seizure provision. Hence, refinement of
the Weeks rule has come about through a line of cases considering
2
what specific acts constitute an "unreasonable" search and seizure.'
While the Weeks decision went no further than the search and
seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment,' 3 the implications of the
opinion were limitless, and it was inevitable that defendants would
seek to extend its principle. It is the purpose of the writer to trace the
9232 U. S. 383, 393, 34 S. Ct. 341, 344, 58 L. ed. 652, 656 (1914).
"However, a number of states have adopted the Weeks rule in regard to state
constitutional provisions similar to the Fourth Amendment. In 1941, nineteen states
and the territory of Alaska followed the Weeks rule. On this subject the following
annotations are available: Notes (1941) 134 A. L. R. 819, (1934) 88 A. L. R. 348,
(1928) 52 A. L. R. 477, (1926) 41 A. L. R. 1145, (1924) 32 A. L. R. 408, (1923) 24 A.
L. R. 1408.
"See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. ed. 1048 (1921),
for Supreme Court ruling that the Weeks rule is inapplicable if other than federal
officers were guilty of the wrongful search and seizure, provided the other party

did not act in collusion with the officers.
"For established qualifications of the Weeks rule, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence

(3d ed. 1940) § 2184a; for numerous annotations on the subject of what constitutes an
unreasonable search and seizure, see A. L. R. Digest, Search and Seizure § 3.
"That reliance on the Fifth Amendment is unnecessary in order to invoke the
Weeks rule, was indicated by Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.
385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. ed. 319 (1920). In this case the Supreme Court applied the
rule in favor of a corporate defendant, though, as such, it was not within the pro-

tection of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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persistent, though violently opposed, extension of the exclusionary sanction ordained by the Weeks case to its present scope, and to point out
his basis for believing that further extensions of the principle are to
be expected.
Extension of the Weeks rule could come about in two ways: by a
liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment which would broaden
the scope of its protection, or by a frank overstepping of constitutional
bounds in order to apply the exclusionary principle to evidence obtained by methods merely violative of statutory prohibitions. In 1928,
however, the majority opinion in the Supreme Court case of Olmstead
v. United States,14 undertook to block both of these avenues of extension. In this case federal agents had obtained a great mass of evidence
proving violation of the National Prohibition Act by means of
tapping telephone wires leading from defendants' residences and office.
The defendants contended that wire tapping amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and that evidence so obtained should have been excluded under
the Weeks rule. This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court
on the grounds that the wording of the Amendment limited its scope
to a search and seizure of tangible things, and that it should not be judicially extended to cover conduct clearly beyond the contemplation
of its framers.
An incidental fact in the Olmstead case was the existence of a state
statute making wire tapping a misdemeanor, which the federal agents
had violated by obtaining evidence in such a manner. Though the
effect of this statute was a point not within the terms of the certiorari
order, the Court went out of its way to make it dear that the violation
of a statute could have no effect on the admissibility of evidence obtained thereby. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court left no doubt
as to his determination to maintain the limitations of the Weeks case.
He pointed out that, "The Weeks case, announced an exception to the
common law rule by excluding all evidence in the procuring of which
government officials took part by methods forbidden by the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. Many state courts do not follow the Weeks
case. [citation omitted] But those who do, treat it as an exception to
the general common law rule and required by constitutional limitations." "Nor can we, without the sanction of congressional enactment,
subscribe to the suggestion that the courts have a discretion to exclude
"'277U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. ed. 944, 66 A. L. R. 376 (1928).
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evidence, the admission of which is not unconstitutional, because unethically secured."' 15
Thus, the majority opinion sought to deliniate the permissible
bounds of the Weeks rule, and to preclude its extension: first, by restricting its application to evidence obtained in violation of the search
and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment, and second, by limiting
the scope of this clause to seizures of tangible things.
The Olmstead case was, however, a 5 to 4 decision, 16 and the tone
of the dissenting opinions revealed a philosophy which would have
extended the exclusionary rule to any case wherein offered evidence
had been obtained by means which were unconstitutional, illegal, or
even unethical. Justices Holmes and Brandeis were the spokesmen for
this view, arguing that, independently of constitutional considerations,
any evidence obtained by unlawful means should be inadmissible.
The Olmstead case thus stands as a pivotal decision in the development of the exclusionary principle now under consideration. The majority stood firm in its basic adherence to the common law rule that
illegality in obtaining evidence does not affect its admissibility, while
according grudging recognition to the Weeks rule as a limited exception not to be extended, and justified only by the exigency of a constitutional mandate. On the other hand, the dissenters, discarding as too
restricted the tenuous dialectic of the Boyd case, frankly advocated replacement of the common law rule of evidence by a rule of policy which
would exclude all evidence obtained by illegal means. Which view
would prevail remained to be seen.
That Congressional sentiment disapproved the view of the Olmstead
majority, at least insofar as wire tapping was concerned, was indicated
by Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934.17 In the
15277 U. S. 438, 467-8, 48 S. Ct. 564, 569, 72 L. ed. 944, 951-2 (1928).

"6The dissenters were Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Butler and Stone.
Holmes doubted the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to wire tapping,
but was of the opinion that the evidence should nevertheless have been excluded, because it had been procured by a method illegal under the state statute.
Brandeis registered an eloquent and exhaustive dissent in which he contended
that the Fourth Amendment did cover wire tapping, but that, even if it did not, the
government should be denied the benefit of evidence obtained by its agents through
criminal acts. He supported this contention by the theory that the government, by
making use of such evidence, ratified the criminality of its officers, hence, that
the doctrine of clean hands should be invoked against the government insofar as it
relied on such evidence to establish its case.
Stone concurred in the opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, while Butler felt that
the Fourth Amendment should be construed to cover wire tapping, but refused to
consider the collateral question as to the effect of the state statute.
1748 Stat. 1o64, 11o3 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 6o5 (1947). "...no person not being
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first Nardone case,18 the Supreme Court interpreted this section as a
Congressional prohibition against admission of evidence obtained by
wire tapping, thus nullifying the holding of the Olmstead case. However, the Nardone decision purported only to apply the section of the
Communications Act which directed that evidence so obtained should
be excluded. As yet, no case had gone as far as to implement a statute
by means of a judicially established rule of evidence.
In the opinion of some, such a case appeared in 1943, when the
Supreme Court handed down its controversial decision in McNabb v.
United States.19 The court reviewed the convictions of members of the
McNabb clan for the murder of a federal revenue officer. After their
arrest by federal officers, the defendants had not been taken before a
committing magistrate, but had been held incommunicado for periods
ranging from four to fourteen hours before arraignment. During this
period they were subjected to intermittent questioning, but no significant evidence of physical mistreatment, or threats thereof, appeared.
Confessions obtained during this detention constituted the crucial evidence against the defendants, without which their convictions could
not stand. Objections to the admission of these confessions had been
made and overruled at the trial.
In its opinion reversing the convictions, the Court expressly excluded the necessity of deciding the case on constitutional grounds.
Rather, the decision was based entirely on its power to promulgate
rules of evidence for federal practice. The Congressional Acts requiring prompt commitment of prisoners were cited,20 and the confessions
held inadmissible, because, "The circumstances in which the statements admitted in evidence against the petitioners were secured reveal
a plain disregard of the duty enjoined by Congress upon federal law
ofcers .... Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence
so procured. But to permit such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction in the federal court would stultify the policy which Congress
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the... purport, ... of such intercepted communication to any person."
"Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. ed. 314 (1937).
"318 U. S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 6o8, 87 L. ed. 819 (1943).
Among the numerous law review articles considering the McNabb case are:
Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court (1948) 43 Ill.
L. Rev. 442; Mallory, McNabb v. United States-The Federal Rule of Admissibility
of Confessions (1943) 27 Marq. L. Rev. 212; Notes (1947) 47 Col. L. Rev. 1214, (1944)
53 Yale L. J. 758, (1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. ioo8.
2D 8 U. S. C. § 595 (1934), as to the duty of federal marshals; 48 Stat. 1oo8 (1934),
5 U. S. C. § 3ooa (1934), as to the duty of officers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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has enacted into law." 21 Thus, the McNabb decision, for the first time,
declared evidence inadmissible because it had been obtained by means
violative of a statute.22 Thereby, the Supreme Court had made its
second encroachment on the common law rule.
The rule of the McNabb case seems explicit enough from the opinion. However, a number of federal judges and writers were apparently
unwilling to conclude that the Supreme Court really meant what it
had said. Consequently, the McNabb rule passed through a period of
conflicting interpretations. The opinion seemed to say that confessions
obtained during detention in violation of the arraignment statutes
must be excluded. Yet, since the Court had dwelt upon the circum
stances and length of the detention in the McNabb case, there were
grounds for another interpretation. It could be regarded as actually
holding that confessions obtained after prolonged detention tended to
be involuntary, and would be excluded when it appeared that such was
the case. Such an interpretation would have constituted the McNabb
rule merely an extension of the long established principle that involuntary confessions are inadmissible because unreliable. Thus, the
test for admissibility of confessions would have remained freedom
from coercion, and not legality of conduct of the officers who obtained
them. Under such an interpretation the McNabb rule would, at most,
have raised a presumption of coercion from the fact of illegal detention. At its weakest, it would have made the violation of the commitment statutes merely one factor to be considered in determining
whether a confession had been coerced. Whether the McNabb case
was to be a precedent-breaking decision of infinite implication, or
merely a variation of an established rule of evidence depended on
which interpretation prevailed.
In 1945, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Mitchell,23 handed
down its first interpretation of the McNabb decision. The opinion
seemed to confirm the "test for coercion" interpretation, and to cast
doubt on the propriety of interpreting the decision as a sanction for
enforcement of commitment statutes. In this case, the defendant had
voluntarily confessed almost immediately after his arrest. Thereafter,
he had been held for eight days before being arraigned before a magistrate. His conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals solely on
"3 1 8 U. S. 332, 344-5, 63 S. Ct. 6o8, 615, 87 L. ed. 819, 826, (1943). [italics supplied]
2On
the same day that the McNabb decision was handed down, the Court in
Anderson v. United States, 318 U. S. 35o, 63 S. Ct. 599, 87 L. ed. 829 (1943), made a
similar ruling in regard to a confession obtained by federal officers during detention in violation of a state commitment statute.
13322 U. S. 65, 64 S. Ct. 896, 88 L. ed. 1141 (1944).
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the grounds that a confession made under such circumstances was inadmissible under the McNabb decision. 24 The Supreme Court reversed
the lower court, and ruled that the McNabb holding was inapplicable
to the facts of the Mitchell case.
The actual holding of the Mitchell case did not preclude either interpretation of the McNabb rule, for it could be regarded as merely
limiting application of the rule to confessions obtained during the
actual period of illegal detention. However the opinion went further
than this. It stated that the decisive features of the McNabb case
were the "inexcusable detention" coupled with "continuous questioning for many hours under psychological pressure." Such language implied that the McNabb rule was applicable only where other facts
indicative of coercion were present, and hence, that freedom from
coercion remained the basic criterion of admissibility. This impression
was strengthened by the Court's concluding remarks: "Our duty in
shaping rules of evidence relates to the propriety of admitting evidence. This power is not to be used as an indirect mode of disciplining
25
misconduct."
After the appearance of such dicta in the Mitchell opinion, it
seemed that the Supreme Court itself viewed the McNabb decision as
having made the violation of the commitment statutes merely a factor
to be considered in determining the voluntariness of a confession. 26
The next Supreme Court ruling involving the McNabb rule did nothing
to dispel this impression. In United States v. BayerYT the defendant
had made a confession before commitment, but this confession was
not offered in evidence. Six months later, after proper arraignment
and while under no illegal restraint, the defendant made a second
confession confirming the admissions of the prior one. The government
based its case on this second confession. The Supreme Court held the
McNabb rule inapplicable to the second confession, and reversed the
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling which had excluded it on that ground.
Here again, from the holding on the facts, the view which the Court
took of the rationale behind the McNabb rule is not dear. The second
confession might have been admissible either because it was not obtained during the period of illegal detention, or because there was
2'18 F. (2d) 426 (App. D. C. 1943).
'5322 U. S. 65, 70-71, 64 S. Ct. 896, 898, 88 L. ed. 1141, 1143 (1944).
"For Circuit Court of Appeals cases which so interpreted the Mitchell decision,
See Boone v. United States, 164 F. (2d) io2 (App. D. C. (1947); Blood v. Hunter, 150
F. (2d) 640 (C. C. A. ioth, 1945); Ruhi v. United States, 148 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. ioth,

1945).
'331 U. S. 532, 67 S. Ct. 1394, 91 L. ed. 1654 (1947).
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no evidence that it was not voluntarily made. However, if the McNabb
rule may be avoided by persuading the accused to make, after commitment, a voluntary confession substantially identical to the inadmissible one, it seems that the defendant in effect has the power to waive
his rights under the commitment statute. Yet, if the Supreme Court
actually intended the McNabb rule to be a means of punishing federal
officers for violation of a public law, the defendant should have no such
right to waiver, and the confirming confession should also be inadmissible. Thus, even after the McNabb case had been considered by
the Supreme Court in two decisions, its rule was still uncertain.
Such was the doubtful status of the McNabb rule when the recent
case of Upshaw v. United States2s came before the Supreme Court.
Both the holding and the opinion of this case affirm the interpretation
of the McNabb rule as a sanction for enforcement of the commitment
statute, and this in such clear and unmistakeable terms as to preclude
any other version of the rule. In the Upshaw case, the defendant had
been held and questioned by federal officers for 30 hours before arraignment, for the admitted reason that until the end of that period they
did not have sufficient evidence to cause a magistrate to hold him. During the course of this pre-commitment questioning, confessions were
obtained upon which the government's case depended. Relying on the
McNabb rule, defendant objected to the introduction of his confessions in evidence. The trial court overruled defendant's objection on
the ground that he had not been unreasonably detained under the circumstances. 29 On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the government prosecutor admitted that the confessions had been obtained in
violation of the commitment rule, and should be excluded. However,
the court rejected this admission and affirmed the trial court's ruling.3 0
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court on the
express ground that the McNabb rule did not constitute a statutory
sanction, but merely provided that illegal detention was a practice
which, in conjunction with other factors, might amount to coercion.
This position was made quite dear: "If it be granted that detaining
'335 U. S. 41o, 69 S. Ct. 17o, 93 L. ed. 129 (1948).
-"Since the date of the McNabb decision, the commitment statutes therein cited,
(see note 20, supra) had been superseded by Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, New Title 18 U. S. C. A. § 687 (1946).
Rule 5(a) provides that, "An officer making an arrest... shall take the arrested
person without unnecessary delay ... " before the nearest committing officer. [italics
supplied] Thus, the District Court thought that under the new commitment statute
the McNabb rule was not here involved.
3168 F. (2d) 167 (App. D. C. 1948).
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him all day Friday was illegal, nevertheless the disclosure he made,
not being the fruit of the illegal detention, was relevant and admissible.
Being relevant, it could be excluded, as the Supreme Court said of
Mitchell's confession, 'only as a punitive measure against unrelated
wrongdoing by the police.' We cannot exclude an admissible confession, and so discharge a confessed criminal, 'as an indirect mode of
disciplining misconduct.' "31 The court concluded that, "The Supreme
Court has never held, as far as we are able to ascertain, that illegal detention of a prisoner, without additional and aggravating circumstances, invalidates a confession which was not induced by it. In fact,
the Mitchell opinion indicates to the contrary ....32
I The Supreme Court, in a succinct opinion, reversed the Circuit
Court of Appeals both as to its holding and its interpretation of the
McNabb case. It pointed out the mistake of the lower court in thinking that, "... the McNabb case did no more than extend the mean-

ing of 'involuntary' confessions to include psychological coercion as
well as that brought about by physical brutality ....The court also
laid stress on the fact that the petitioner's detention unlike McNabb's,
'was not aggravated by continuous questioning for many hours by
numerous officers.'" "We hold that this case falls squarely within the
McNabb ruling and is not taken out of it by what was decided in the
33
Mitchell case."
In the Upshaw opinion the Court limited the Mitchell case to its
holding on the facts-"that Mitchell's subsequent illegal detention did
not render inadmissible his prior confessions." Then, apparently endeavoring to clear up all confusion concerning the McNabb decision,
the Court recognized that it had considered the circumstances of the
detention in that case, but explained that, "This was done to show
that the record left no doubt that the McNabbs were not promptly
taken before a judicial officer as the law required,....-34 Lest there
be any further doubt, the Court reiterated that, "The McNabb confessions were thus held inadmissible because the McNabbs"were questioned while held 'in plain disregardof the duty enjoined by Congresi
upon Federal law officers' promptly to take them before a judicial
officer." 35
a168 F. (2d) 167, 169 (App. D. C. 1948).
0168 F. (2d) 167, 169 (App. D. C. 1948).
3
' 35 U. S. 410, 412, 69 S. Ct. 170, 171, 93 L. ed. 129, 131 (1948). Justice Reed
registered a strong dissenting opinion which epitomizes the arguments of those who
oppose the McNabb rule. The Chief Justice, and Justices Jackson and Burton
joined in this opinion.
3'55 U. S. 410, 41, 69 S. Ct. 170, 171, 93 L. ed. 129, 131 (1948).
1
"5335 U. S. 410, 4 3, 69 S. Ct. 170, 171, 93 L. ed. 129, 131 (1948). [italics supplied]
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After the Upshaw decision there can be no doubt that a majority of
the present Supreme Court intends to apply the McNabb case according
to the original import of its opinion. That is, the fact that a confession
was obtained by federal officers while acting contrary to the commitment rule, will be an independent ground for its exclusion. In addition to determining whether the confession was voluntarily made, a federal court must now also determine whether, at the time it was made,
the defendant was being held illegally.
Thus, as the law now stands, the defendant in a federal criminal
trial has available to him two judge-made exceptions to the common
law rule of evidence. Under the Weeks decision he may demand the
exclusion and return of evidence acquired by means of a search and
seizure violative of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Under
the McNabb decision he may demand the exclusion of any confession
obtained from him during detention violative of the commitment
statute.
The opinion in the Upshaw case reveals the willingness of the present Supreme Court to apply the exclusionary sanction of the Weeks
case to the enforcement of at least one statutory directive. An opinion
handed down on the same day as the Upshaw case gives grounds for
speculation as to whether the Court might not be inclined to extend
the sanction to cover other illegal acts by federal officers. In McDonald v. United States, 36 the Supreme Court reviewed the convictions of
co-defendants McDonald and Washington for carrying on a numbers
game in the District of Columbia. The police had long suspected McDonald of this offense, and on the day of his arrest three policemen
had surrounded the boarding house in which he lived. Hearing a noise
inside the house which sounded like an adding machine, one officer
raised the window of the landlady's room and climbed through. He
then admitted the others by unlocking the door of the house. The
officers, without either an arrest or search warrant, then searched the
house, and, upon looking over the transom of McDonald's room, saw
both defendants in the act of adding up the day's receipts, surrounded
by policy slips and money. They were thereupon arrested, and the
money, policy slips and adding machines seized. McDonald, relying on
the Weeks rule, based his appeal upon the refusal of the trial court to
exclude this evidence and return it to him upon motion.
The Supreme Court, purporting to apply the Weeks rule, held that
this evidence should have been excluded and returned as McDonald
contended, and reversed the convictions of both defendants. The Court
was of the opinion that such conduct by federal officers could be justi"335 U. S. 451, 69 S. Ct. 191, 93 L. ed. 144 (1948).
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fled only by an emergency which risked the escape of the suspects, and
found no such extenuation present in this case.
The Court apparently found no difficulty in applying the Weeks
rule to such facts. Upon analysis, however, it is difficult to discover any
search which violated the rights of either defendant under the Fourth
Amendment.37 Nor, in fact, does the principal opinion make any effort
to show in what respect the officers' acts were unconstitutional as to
defendants. However, the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson, in
which he undertook to explain wherein this means of obtaining evidence was objectionable, casts considerable light on the philosophy
underlying the decision. He admits that McDonald would have had no
grounds of complaint had the police been lawfully admitted by the
landlady or another boarder, and had thereafter discovered the crime
by looking -over the transom. However, Justice Jackson suggests that
McDonald had a "constitutionally protected interest in the integrity
and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and
entry."3s In fact, it is implicit throughout his opinion that the evi37The view of the dissent, 335 U. S. 451, 461, 69 S. Ct. 191, 196, 93 L. ed. 144, 150
(1948), that there was no such search, seems sound. If official conduct such as was involved in the McDonald case enables a defendant to invoke the Weeks rule, then one
or more supposedly well established qualifications of the rule seem overruled thereby.
(i) If the objectionable feature was the unlawful entry and search of other
parts of the boarding house, in regard to which McDonald had no right of privacy,
then the case would hold that evidence is inadmissible when obtained in violation
of the rights of third parties. This result would overrule numerous federal lower
court cases which held the Weeks rule applicable only to evidence obtained in
violation of the defendant's rights, as well as the rationale of the Supreme Court
case of Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S. 114, 62 S. Ct. iooo 86 L. ed. 1312 (1912),
which was based on express approval of these cases.
(2) If lookfng over the transom of McDonald's room constituted the unconstitutional search and seizure of information, then the Olmstead limitation of the
Fourth Amendment to searches and seizures of tangible things seems repudiated.
See note 14, supra.
(3) If, as the opinion of the Court suggests, the discovery and seizure of the
money, policy slips and adding machine constituted the objectionable search and
seizure, then the essential qualification which precludes application of the Weeks
rule to visible evidence seized upon a lawful arrest, must be deemed abrogated. On
this qualification, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence ( 3 d. ed. 1940) § 2184a(3), and cases
cited. (The warrantless arrest in the McDonald case was lawful, since the officers
had discovered defendants in the act of committing the offense.)
The Supreme Court upheld this qualification in: Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U. S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. ed. 374 (1931); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 7o L. ed. 145 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267
U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. ed. 543 (1925). The opinion of the Weeks case itself
indicates such a qualification; see 232 U. S. 383, 392, 34 S. Ct. 341, 344, 58 L. ed. 652
(1914).
-'335 U. S. 451, 458, 69 S. Ct. 191, 194, 93 L. ed. 144, 149 (1948). [italics supplied]
The constitutional derivation of this broad right on the part of mere roomers
is not indicated.
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dence was inadmissible for the sole reason that the police committed
the felony of breaking and entering while obtaining it.39 As Justice
Jackson stated it: "Having forced an entry without either a search
warrant or an arrest warrant to justify it, the felonious character of their
entry, it seems to me, followed every step of their journey inside the
house and tainted its fruits with illegality." 40 His policy motivation
is apparent in his concluding statement: "I am the less reluctant to
reach this conclusion because the method of enforcing the law exemplified by this search is one which not only violates legal rights of
defendant but is certain to involve the police in grave troubles if continued .... I have no reluctance in condemning as unconstitutional
a method of law enforcement so reckless and so fraught with danger
and discredit to the law enforcement agencies themselves." 41 A clearer
indication of a sentiment toward punishing law enforcement officers
for any misconduct by excluding evidence obtained thereby, is difficult
42
to conceive.
It may be that the McDonald case will have little precedent-value
beyond its facts. Its significance lies rather in its indication of an inclination on the part of a majority of the Supreme Court to extend the
exclusionary principle of the Weeks case, and perhaps to apply it to
exclude evidence obtained by any illegal conduct. It seems to make
little difference whether this extension takes the form of a very broad
interpretation of constitutional protections, as Justice Jackson suggests,
or whether it is to be based on frank acceptance of the principle that
evidence illegally obtained is subject to exclusion. 43 If the McDonald
"This view is particularly apparent in Justice Jackson's contention as to codefendant Washington's right. Since Washington was merely a guest on the premises,
clearly his constitutional protection against search and seizure had not been violated.
The principal opinion recognized this distinction, and based its reversal of Washington's conviction on the theory that, had the evidence been properly returned
to McDonald, it would not have been available against Washington. Jackson argued
that Washington had an independent right to demand exclusion on his own behalf,
since, as to him, the evidence was the "fruit" of felonious official 'conduct.
"335 U. S. 451, 459, 69 S. Ct. 191, 195, 93 L ed. 144, 149 (1948).
"335 U. S. 451, 46o-1, 69 S. Ct. 191, 195-6, 93 L. ed. 144, 150 (1948).
"As for the other Justices supporting the McDonald decision, Justice Frankfurter concurred in Justice Jackson's opinion while Justice Rutledge revealed a
willingness to forego constitutional consideration, and to exclude any evidence illegally obtained.
The philosophy of the other two majority Justices, Black and Douglas, cannot
be ascertained from the opinion. However, their mere participation in the McDonald
decision indicates their readiness to liberalize the application of the Weeks rule.
See note 38, supra.
"The latter is the "Holmes-Brandeis" view expressed in the Olmstead dissent.
See note 16, supra.
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case is an accurate reflection of Supreme Court sentiment, then future
federal criminal trials may come to involve a collateral trial of the conduct of federal officers in gathering proffered evidence. It is dear that,
as to conduct within the scope of the Weeks and McNabb rules, such a
situation already exists.
It is difficult to relinquish this topic without expressing some
opinion as to the propriety of utilizing a rule of evidence for such purposes. Since the appearance of the Weeks case, this question has been
the subject of heated controversy, with most writers condemning such
a perversion of the function of a rule of evidence. 44 Needless to say,
law enforcement officers themselves have been vociferous in their cri45
ticism of the doctrine.
The most weighty objection to such a principle is that dwelt upon
by Wigmore, that society suffers by the release of a criminal, while the
officer at fault suffers no more than his disappointment at the loss of a
conviction. 46 In short, it is argued that the rule provides an ineffective
means of disciplining police officers, at the expense of serious social
detriment. It is contended that, instead of excluding evidence illegally
obtained, effective restraint of over-zealous officers should take the form
of more certain disciplinary action than that which they risk under
the present system of collateral proceedings at the instance of the individual aggrieved. Wigmore advocates as a solution that the officer at
fault be cited for contempt by the court in which his illegally obtained
evidence is introduced.
It appears to the writer, however, that the critics of the principle, in
emphasizing its failure to punish police officers effectively, are criticizing it for failure to achieve a result which should not be its proper
function.
When convicting evidence is excluded, two individuals are affected
thereby. One is the police officer, who may be subject to censure by his
"For writers opposing the principle, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence ( 3d. ed. 1940)
§ 2184; Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence (1944) 42 Mich L. Rev. 679;
Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure (1925) 19 Ill. L. Rev. 3o3;
Knox, Self Incrimination (1925) 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. '39; Fraenkel, Concerning
Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361.
For writers favoring the principle, see Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. ii; Chafee,
The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922 (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 694.
OzLaw enforcement agencies were instrumental in causing the deletion of proposed Rule 5(b) from the final draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal 'Procedure.
See note 29, supra. As proposed, Rule 5(b) would have codified the McNabb rule.
""Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks
it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else." See 8 Wigmore, Evidence
(3d ed. 194o) 40.
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superiors, and who loses whatever benefit he might have derived from a
conviction. Admittedly, such a penalty is an unsatisfactory means of
disciplining the officer, comparable to slapping his wrist. Especially
is this true if, as is frequently the case, his superiors commend, rather
than censure, his excess of zeal. However, also directly affected is the
defendant, who, being shielded from the consequences of official violation of his rights, is undoubtedly accorded direct and highly effective
protection of those rights. Constitutional and congressional mandates
impose a duty upon the law enforcement officer, but they concurrently
establish a right in favor of the accused. While the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence may be an inadequate means of enforcing such a
mandate against the officer, no more effective means is conceivable by
which to enforce it in favor of the defendant. The efficacy of this evi
dential sanction as a means of effectuating individual rights accounts
for its origin and vitality, though it is admitted that in its application
courts have not adhered consistently to this purpose. However, when
the application of this sanction is tempered by a recognition of its
proper function, its critics have no tenable grounds on which to belittle
its effectiveness.
But what can be said in justification of the social detriment incident to the release of guilty defendants, convictable only by means of
illegally obtained evidence? Fundamentally, the answer to this question
lies in a weighing of individual rights against the social benefits to be
derived from unhindered prosecutions, and in deciding which should
prevail in this instance. This decision, in turn, will be determined by
the nature of each individual's experience and social philosophy. However, it is undeniable that consistency to certain fundamental and highly revered tenets of our political system demands the enduring of the
social detriment risked by the exclusion of evidence obtained through
official violation of individual rights. If it be accepted that the acts of
law enforcement are not to be excepted from the recognized right of
all citizens to judicial protection against unlawful conduct, and if it
be accepted that a citizen is not to be deprived of his rights by mere
indictment, then such a risk seems a feature properly imposed upon
our society by the nature of its institutions.
Legal technicians, while recognizing the propriety of implementing
individual rights, may condemn as inappropriate the utilization of a
rule of evidence to achieve this result. Admittedly, such a practice does
pervert the natural function of a rule of evidence. Yet, that such a departure is justifiable and quite appropriate in this instance is arguable,
for even the veil of legal dogma cannot hide the patent hypocrisy of a
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court's mouthing solemn reverence for the inviolability of individual
rights, while simultaneously convicting a citizen on the basis of evidence obtained through contemptuous disregard of those rights. It is
small comfort to one so convicted, or to any other citizen, to be assured
that the highhanded official risks, and may incur, punishment of doubtful severity. Rather, it would seem that a rule excluding such evidence
is a highly appropriate means of rectifying the wrong.
At first glance, it might well appear "misguided sentimentality"
to advocate such tender solicitude on the part of courts for the rights of
a criminal. It has so been argued.47 This contention is met by pointing
out that, if the accused is not deemed guilty until proven so, it would
appear to be the height of inconsistency to expedite such proof on the
assumption that he is guilty. Rather, the sanctity with which we endow
our individual liberties would seem ample justification for the social
inconvenience of obtaining convictions without the use of evidence
obtained by the desecration of those liberties. To allow the government
the benefit of evidence obtained in violation of the accused's recognized
rights is, in practical effect, to grant the government license to violate
these rights, provided it can induce its agents to risk the penalty. Such a
result is antipathetic to both the letter and the spirit of our political
precepts.
Thus, it is submitted that, as a means of implementing the rights of
the defendant, rather than as a means of disciplining the agents of the
government, the principle of excluding illegally obtained evidence is
not indefensible. This view necessarily implies that the principle should
be limited in its application to the scope necessary to protect such
rights, and should be neither regarded nor utilized as a means of
punishment of police officers. Thereby, the exclusionary sanction would
be confined within the bounds of its justification, and a rational line
of demarcation would be available beyond which a court need not pursue its collateral inquiry.
Specifically, such a refinement of purpose, while preserving the beneficial aspects of the principle, would have the desirable effect of precluding its application to dissassociated wrongdoing such as the breaking
and entry in the McDonald case. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this
distinction would seem to offer a sound basis for reconciling the
Mitchell4s and Bayer49 cases with the McNabb5" and Upshaw5 ' decis'7See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.

194o) pi.
U. S. 65, 64 S. Ct. 896, 88 L. ed. 1140 (1944).
"w331 U. S. 532, 67 S. Ct. 1394, 91 L. ed. 1654 (1947).
r"318 U. S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 6o8, 87 L. ed. 81g (1943)
m'335 U. S. 41o, 69 S. Ct. 170, 93 L. ed. 129 (1948).
's322

18

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VII

ions, though no such distinction was expressly drawn by any of these
opinions. If the goal of punishing police officers is discarded for that
of protecting the rights of the accused, the Supreme Court was entirely consistent with the original McNabb rule in holding in the
Mitchell case that subsequent unlawful detention did not retroactively
render the confession inadmissible. For, under these facts, the proffered
confession had not been obtained in violation of defendant's rights,
since, at the time the confession was made he had no right to arraignment under the statute. 52 Likewise, the Bayer decision, holding, in
effect, that the accused could waive the McNabb rule by making, after
proper commitment, a second confession in confirmation of the inadmissible one, would be a consistent application of the rule in view of
the suggested distinction. For, if the only purpose of the McNabb rule
is to protect the rights of the accused it would follow that, as in any
other instance, the accused should have the power to waive his rights.
Just where, and by what criterion, the Supreme Court will actually
draw the line in the application of its exclusionary sanction, remains
to be seen. However, the tenor of the McDonald and Upshaw opinions
indicates that the possibilities of the principle have yet to be fully explored. Therefore, it is to be expected that future decisions will bring
an even broader segment of official conduct under the surveillance of
federal courts, as an incident to the Court's power, and apparent inclination, to utilize federal rules of evidence to supervise the ethics of
federal law enforcement.

r2In the Mitchell case the confession was made almost immediately after arrest.

